Judicial practice is clear: electric scooters are considered motorized vehicles, meaning drunk driving can be committed on them as well, said the head of the criminal division of the Budapest Court of Appeal at the court’s media club on Tuesday.
Ákos Ujvári explained that a survey conducted in the summer of 2024 found that there are 100,000 electric scooters in Hungary.
He added that while electric scooters are not listed in the appendix of the Highway Code (KRESZ) as vehicles, and there are no defined speed limits, lighting regulations, or safety equipment requirements for them, judicial practice is unequivocal in recognizing that drunk driving can still be committed on electric scooters.
In criminal law, the concept of a motorized vehicle is unified and clear: any vehicle powered by an internal engine is considered motorized. Since electric scooters are used in public traffic for personal transportation and powered by a built-in battery, drunk driving laws apply to them as well.
He emphasized that the fundamental rule of KRESZ, “do not endanger,” applies to all road users and, according to judicial practice, comes into effect when specific rules are not in place to address a behavior that endangers traffic. He cited an example: if an electric scooter rider causes serious bodily harm to another person, they can be held criminally liable for crimes against bodily integrity.
Additionally, Ribai Csilla, the president of the Budapest Court of Appeal, discussed rules regarding the compulsory share of an inheritance during the media club session.
She explained that the compulsory share guarantees a minimum portion of the inheritance for the deceased’s closest relatives and spouse, and it comes into play if the deceased excludes their lawful heirs in their will or if there is no inheritance because it was depleted through gifts made during their lifetime.
Ribai Csilla highlighted that claims for the compulsory share expire after five years, and each eligible person can independently seek enforcement of their claim in court. However, those who have been validly disinherited in a legally binding will are not entitled to a compulsory share.
She also pointed out that disinheritance can only occur for one of the ten reasons specified in the Civil Code, and only if they are proven to be true.
One example of a valid reason for disinheritance is if the beneficiary is serving a prison sentence that has not yet been completed. Disinheritance is also valid if the beneficiary failed to provide necessary assistance to the deceased when it was needed or if an adult descendant demonstrated gross ingratitude. Additionally, a person can be disinherited if they attempted to take the life of the deceased, committed a crime against them, or obstructed the free expression of their will.
Ribai Csilla noted that if the deceased forgave the disinherited person before their death, they could still be entitled to the compulsory share.
Regarding the size of the compulsory share, she stated that the beneficiary is entitled to one-third of what the lawful heirs would receive. The compulsory share consists of the net value of the estate and any gifts the deceased made to anyone.
However, the total estate value must subtract estate debts, such as funeral costs, inheritance acquisition costs, and any debts of the deceased.
Gifts are valued at the time of donation, unless this would be grossly unfair, such as if the value of real estate has significantly increased since the gift was made.
The Court of Appeal’s media club presentation is available for viewing on the court’s YouTube channel.
(MTI)
